It is not unusual in daily business situations to have an oral (parol) contract or collateral agreement. But the perils of this situation are widely reported especially in terms of proving the existence and exact conditions of such agreements. It was therefore rather refreshing to see the courts supporting a “happy end” (for at least one party) in such a situation. This case also provides an interesting insight into the day-to-day practicalities of the rules of interpretation and the burden of proof for implied contracts and terms. In the case of Kucukkoylu v Ozcan (30 June 2014 [2014] EWHC 1972 (QB)) the trial court was required to settle a dispute between the claimant (C) and the defendant (D) regarding their entitlement to lottery winnings. D was employed by C. He had had a dream that he was holding a large bundle of cash with C standing in front of him. D was a strong believer in the power of dreams and interpreted it to mean that he and C would win the lottery. On January 30, 2012 a ticket was bought for the EuroMillions lottery which won the raffle prize of £1 million, which C claimed. It was D’s case that he and C had agreed, either explicitly or impliedly, to jointly purchase the ticket and that he was entitled to one half of the proceeds of the win in accordance with their agreement. It was C’s case that there had been no discussion or agreement as to sharing the ticket. Judgment was entered by the court accordingly. For D to succeed he would effectively have to prove that a contract existed with C for the purchase of a lottery ticket jointly and that the terms of the contract gave rise either expressly or impliedly to an equal share of the beneficial interest, in the form of the prize money. On the balance of probability, D had had a dream which involved him and C and a large sum of money. D had then pestered C into playing the lottery with him. D suggested and C agreed that they would play the game “50/50” or “half and half” or words to that effect. They both contributed equally to the purchase price of the ticket. D went to the shop to play the lottery and gave C the tickets. D retained the receipt and the play slips. C later discovered that he had won and D challenged him about the ticket. C became angry and threatening and swore at D. Subsequently, through intermediaries, C attempted to persuade D to drop his claim. The effect of those conversations was that C and D had entered into a contract to jointly play...

Contracts should not be a lottery. Get it signed and in writing: this is not only a rule of common sense but also a fundamental principle for commercial contracts and indeed, any agreement. Although they may help you with luck at the lottery (as we see in one of this month’s cases), dreams and parol contracts are not a good foundation for doing business. In contrast, on page 2 you will discover how working with the law can be a very bitter experience. 🙂 Stuart...

I always thought our North American collegues were the most innovative and inventive when it comes to marketing and bringing the law directly to the potential client. But I must admit that in recent years English solicitors are becoming just as creative as their cousin attorneys across the big water. The following is a brief extract from the webite of the English law firm of Cooper & Co. (http://www.doglaw.co.uk/). Cooper & Co. have certainly found an interesting niche in dog law (and the animated terriers and paw imprints on the website are a real attention grabber). But who is looking after the cats? Is your dog accused of being a Pit Bull Terrier type? There are details on this website in the FAQ section which sets out the basis of these cases under Section 1 or 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. If you would like to instruct us to represent you in the proceedings please phone us. For all other dog related legal queries: We offer a telephone advice service. This is a premium rate line and calls are charged at £1.53 per minute from a BT landline (other networks may vary and mobiles will cost considerably more). The line is generally available during normal office hours Monday to Friday. The kind of cases that we can advise on include:- Ownership / access disputes Disputes between breeders and buyers Disputes between rescues and owners / former owners Defending personal injury claims Damages claims (dog on dog, dog on other animal, or dog damaging property) Claims against...

Generally, commercial contract parties want to avoid at all costs any legal proceedings, whether they be at court or before an arbitration tribunal. They often try to achieve this in a contract by way of a conflict resolution clause. But how does English law regard such clauses, especially if they refer to general concepts of “good faith”? This year there appears to have been a major change in the judicial approach to such tiered or escalation resolution clauses. Perhaps this will bring English law in line with existing commercial practice and the legal position in other European jurisdictions by allowing a more relaxed approached to interpretation and enforcement. Read on… Stuart...

Should the judiciary be pro-actively involved in addressing perceived social imbalances and injustices? If so, to what extent should a court be entitled to “punish” without such sanctions first being set out by the legislature in statute? These are interesting constitutional, jurisprudential and philosophical issues that reflect the conflict not only between common (case) law and statute law but also between the role of the legislature and the courts. It is an issue that, at least in relation to punitive (exemplary) damages, has found two solutions in two jurisdictions. But that is perhaps a reflection on the social philosophies and systems in the respective countries. Enjoy your coffee! Stuart...

German subtitle: “glühende Landschaft” Texas Administrative Code §111.219 …(3) Burning shall be commenced and conducted only when wind direction and other meteorological conditions are such that smoke and other pollutants will not cause adverse effects to any public road, landing strip, navigable water, or off-site structure containing sensitive receptor(s). For the purposes of the rule, “structure containing sensitive receptors” is defined as follows: A man-made structure utilized for human residence or business, the containment of livestock, or the housing of sensitive live vegetation. The term “man-made structure” does not include such things as range fences, roads, bridges, hunting blinds, or facilities used solely for the storage of hay or other livestock feeds. The term “sensitive live vegetation” is defined as vegetation that has potential to be damaged by smoke and heat, examples of which include, but are not limited to, nursery production, mushroom cultivation, pharmaceutical plant production, or laboratory experiments involving plants. (4) If at any time the burning causes or may tend to cause smoke to blow onto or across a road or highway, it is the responsibility of the person initiating the burn to post flag-persons on affected roads. (5) Burning must be conducted downwind of or at least 300 feet (90 meters) from any structure containing sensitive receptors located on adjacent properties unless prior written approval is obtained from the adjacent occupant with possessory control. (6) Burning shall be conducted in compliance with the following meteorological and timing considerations: (A) The initiation of burning shall commence no earlier than one hour after sunrise. Burning shall be completed on the same day not later than one hour before sunset, and shall be attended by a responsible party at all times during the active burn phase when the fire is progressing. In cases where residual fires and/or smoldering objects continue to emit smoke after this time, such areas shall be extinguished if the smoke from these areas has the potential to create a nuisance or traffic hazard condition. In no case shall the extent of the burn area be allowed to increase after this time. (B) Burning shall not be commenced when surface wind speed is predicted to be less than six miles per hour (mph) (five knots) or greater than 23 mph (20 knots) during the burn period. (C) Burning shall not be conducted during periods of actual or predicted persistent low-level atmospheric temperature inversions. §111.219 The authority to conduct outdoor burning under this regulation does not exempt or excuse any person responsible from the consequences, damages, or injuries resulting from the burning and does not exempt or excuse anyone from complying with all other applicable laws or ordinances, regulations, and orders of governmental entities having jurisdiction,...